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Abstract
In public procurement auctions, governments routinely offer preferences to qualified firms in the form
of bid discounts. Previous studies on bid discounting do not account for affiliation – a form of cost
dependence between bidders that is likely to occur in a public procurement environment. Utilizing
data from the New Mexico Department of Transportation’s Resident Preference Program, I develop and
estimate an empirical model of firm bidding and entry that allows for affiliation in firms’ project costs. I
find evidence of affiliation and show how it changes preference auction outcomes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Procurement auctions are widely used by governments as a means of securing goods and services for the
lowest possible price. Internationally, government procurement accounts for anywhere from 10 to 25 percent
of GDP, and in the United States alone, government spending on goods and services accounted for 15.2
percent of GDP in 2013, totaling $2.55 trillion.1 In these procurement auctions, governments routinely offer
preferential treatment to a certain group of bidders. This treatment often takes the form of bid discounting
– a policy where the government will lower the bids of preferred bidders for comparison purposes and pay
the full asking price to the winner. These preferential policies can affect auction outcomes and have been
studied extensively in the literature.2
In many cases, the purpose of offering these preference programs is to encourage the participation of a
particular type of bidder. For example, California offers a bid discount to small businesses to encourage
these business to bid on larger projects, and the Inter-American Development Bank offers a bid discount
to domestic firms to encourage domestic development. The total effect of these programs, however, has
been shown to be ambiguous. Although offering bid discounts can encourage preferred bidders to bid less
aggressively, which means they bid further from their costs, bid discounts also encourage non-preferred bidders
to bid more aggressively, or closer to their costs, and can increase competition and discourage non-preferred
participation. This type of trade-off is highlighted in McAfee and McMillan [1989] where the authors show
that the government can minimize procurement costs by choosing an optimal discount level when participation
is fixed and in Corns and Schotter [1999] where the authors use experiments to show that preferences can
lead to increases in both cost effectiveness and the representation of preferred bidders.3 Krasnokutskaya and
Seim [2011] show that the magnitudes of these effects are altered when participation is endogenous.
Another potential factor in evaluating these programs is the possibility of affiliation, or dependence,
between a firm’s cost of completing a project, which I will now call its project cost, and the project costs
of its competitors. These costs are private information, and the literature has typically taken them to be
independent, which implies that a firm that learns its own project cost has no additional information on the
project costs of other bidders. There are a number of reasons why this independence assumption may not hold.
For instance, firms may use the same subcontractors when submitting a bid, so firms sharing subcontractors
1These numbers are taken from the World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files.
2See Krasnokutskaya and Seim [2011], Marion [2007], and Hubbard and Paarsch [2009] for papers discussing bid discounting.
3Additional studies that show the theoretical implications of granting preference to certain groups of bidders include Vagstad
[1995] who extends the analysis of McAfee and McMillan [1989] to incentive contracts and Naegelen and Mougeot [1998] who
extend the analysis of McAfee and McMillan [1989] to include objectives concerning the distribution of contracts over preferred
and non-preferred bidders.
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should have some form of dependence in their project costs. Firms may also buy raw materials from the
same suppliers, which again can generate dependence in project costs.
The existence of affiliation can potentially change a number of preference auction outcomes. For a given
number of participants, affiliation makes firms more ‘similar’ in the sense that they are more likely to have
similar project costs relative to independence. Firms will therefore adjust how they bid, which can change
both procurement costs and firm profits conditional on entry. If a firm’s incentive to participate is influenced
by the expected profitability of a project, then affiliation can also affect the number of favored entrants
and auction efficiency. Consequently, the total effectiveness of these preference programs can hinge on the
presence of affiliation.
This paper contributes to the bid preference literature by allowing firms to have affiliated private project
costs in procurement auctions with bid discounting and endogenous entry.4 Affiliation is a stronger notion
of positive correlation, and it captures the idea that firm project costs may be related to each other. Using
copula methods developed by Hubbard, Li, and Paarsch [2012] and extended by Li and Zhang [2015], I
evaluate a bid preference program favoring resident bidders in New Mexico and show the bias that can arise
from assuming independence.
I collect the data from New Mexico Department of Transportation (NMDOT) highway construction
contracts. New Mexico is one of a few states that offer qualified resident firms a 5 percent bid discount on
state-funded projects. Affiliation is plausible in this setting; firms located close to each other are more likely
to buy from the same suppliers and use similar subcontractors, potentially generating dependence in project
costs. In fact, 30 percent of items5 on construction projects qualifying for bid preferences had at least two
firms bid the same amount in the data. This statistic suggests that firms may have similar costs of completing
some portions of a project.
To then determine the extent to which affiliation is present in NMDOT highway construction contracts,
compare outcomes under affiliation and independence, and investigate alternative discount levels, I develop
and estimate an empirical model of bidding with endogenous entry, where I allow for affiliation in firm
project costs. I obtain a positive and statistically significant estimate on the parameter that measures
affiliation, which indicates that firms have affiliated project costs. Counterfactual auctions with alternative
discount levels reveal that New Mexico’s preference program actually led to a slight decrease in procurement
costs of 0.4 percent. By comparing counterfactual outcomes under affiliation and independence, I find that
4This paper also complements the existing literature on auctions with endogenous entry. These papers include Athey et al.
[2011], Li [2005], Sweeting and Bhattacharya [2015] and Bajari and Hortacsu [2003].
5Items are portions of a construction project. The final bid is calculated as the sum of the bids on each item.
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affiliation makes procurement more expensive (by about 3.3 percent under the current program), but gives
discounting more leverage in affecting the proportion of preferred winners. Finally, I find that affiliation can
lead to substantial differences in efficiency, highlighting the relevance of affiliation in the evaluation of public
procurement auctions with bid discounting.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II. outlines New Mexico’s procurement process
and describes the data. Section III. presents the theoretical framework by which I analyze the effect of
affiliation on bidding and entry behavior, and section IV. shows how I represent affiliated distributions using
copulas. Section V. shows the different ways in which affiliation can affect bidding, and section VI. shows how
I estimate the theoretical model. Section VII. presents the empirical findings, while section VIII. contains
the counterfactual policy analysis. Section IX. concludes.
II. NEW MEXICO’S HIGHWAY PROCUREMENT MARKET AND
DATA
This section describes the process by which the NMDOT awards their highway construction contracts and
summarizes the data collected for the empirical portion of this paper. The sample contains 376 highway
construction contracts awarded by the NMDOT through sealed bidding between 2010 and 2014 for the
maintenance and construction of roads, bridges, ramps, and other types of transportation systems.6 New
Mexico applies preferences to resident firms on state-funded construction projects. Over the sample period,
there are a total 23 of these state-funded contracts, while the remaining 353 projects are federally assisted
projects.
The New Mexico data has a couple of advantages and disadvantages. A benefit of the New Mexico
data is that it is unusually detailed in its project advertisements, which allows me to construct an extensive
set of observable project characteristics. This feature is particularly important because any unobserved
project heterogeneity, or project characteristics observed by the bidders but unobserved by the researcher,
will bias my estimates. An immediate limitation of the New Mexico data is that there are a small number of
preference projects relative to the number of non-preference projects.7 In response to this limitation, much
of my analysis relies on the empirical model of entry and bidding. Although the small number of preference
6For a detailed description of the type of work required on these projects, see Appendix E.
7Based on my conversations with NMDOT employees, one reason why there are so few state-funded projects is that a project
must be entirely funded by state funds in order to be listed as a state project. Some projects use a mix of state and federal
funds, but if any part of the project uses federal funds, then that project is listed as a federally assisted project. Every once in
a while, the state will receive ‘capital outlay’ funds for NMDOT projects or use state maintenance funds or state severance tax
funds to fund entire projects, but these sources of funding are not prevalent in financing these types of auctions.
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auctions might limit how well the empirical model can predict preference outcomes, the model allows me to
use both preference and non-preference auction data to identify the model primitives while accounting for
changes due to bid discounting.
II.(i). Letting
Four weeks prior to the date of bid opening, the NMDOT advertises construction projects estimated to cost
more than $60,000. The Contracts Unit is responsible for gathering the necessary contract documents used
during this advertisement phase. Every document is unique to the work required on each project and contains
details such as the location of the project, the nature of the work, the number of working days to complete
the project, and the length of the project. The NMDOT summarizes these details in an ‘Invitation for Bids’
document, and I use this document to form the set of observable project characteristics.
Another feature of advertising is providing a rough approximation of firms who could potentially bid
for a contract. To advertise potential competitors, the NMDOT publishes a list of ‘planholders’ ten days
prior to bid opening. Firms attain planholder status by providing some documented evidence that they have
the contract documents, either directly through the NMDOT or through written communication. Moreover,
failure to seek planholder status results in the bid becoming unresponsive and subsequently rejected.8 Given
that the list of planholders is known prior to bidding and that planholder status is required to submit a valid
bid, I use the firms who are registered as planholders as a measure of the set of potential bidders.9
In awarding these construction projects, the NMDOT uses a competitive first-price, sealed-bid procure-
ment auction format. Potential firms who decide to bid on a project submit bids in a sealed envelope or
through a secure online submission website to the NMDOT. The firm with the lowest bid (usually) wins the
contract, and the state pays the winner their bid. The NMDOT tabulates and publishes submitted bids as
well as an engineer’s estimate for the cost of the project in an Apparent Low Bids document directly after bid
opening. I use the bids and estimates in these documents as the bids and estimates received by the NMDOT
for each project. Projects can be renegotiated after letting for a number of different reasons; in order to keep
my analysis tractable, I abstract away from the renegotiation process.
8For more information on the planholder requirement, see the NMDOT website.
9This measure is not perfect. Some firms seek planholder status after the list is published, resulting in a larger set of potential
bidders than what is listed in the planholder document. To account for this difference, I include any actual bidders that do not
appear in the planholder document in the set of potential entrants. Moreover, the set of planholders may contain firms that do
not have the means to bid as a prime contractor. In order to get a more accurate representation of the set of firms who could
potentially bid, I do not include firms who are unsuccessful in submitting a valid bid during the sample period in the set of
planholders.
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II.(ii). Resident Preference Program
Similar to other states such as Alaska, Nevada, Ohio, and Wyoming, New Mexico offers bid preferences to
qualified resident firms on construction projects funded exclusively by the state. Like these other states,
New Mexico implements its preference through a 5 percent discount on bids, which lowers resident bids by 5
percent for evaluation purposes and pays the full asking price conditional on winning. For example, suppose
that a resident firm and a non-resident firm are the only two firms bidding for a contract. Furthermore,
suppose that the resident firm bids $1,000,000 and the non-resident firm bids $975,000. After applying the
five percent discount to the resident firm, its bid is lowered to $950,000, it wins the contract, and the state
pays it $1,000,000.
To qualify for resident preference, firms must meet a certain list of conditions. In particular, firms must
have paid property taxes on real property owned in the state of New Mexico for at least five years prior to
approval and employ at least 80 percent of their workforce from the state of New Mexico. There are also a
number of penalties in place to prevent firms from exploiting residency status. Providing false information
to the state of New Mexico in order to qualify as a resident results in automatic removal of any preferences,
ineligibility to apply for any more preference for at least five years, and administrative fines of up to $50,000
for each violation. I obtain a list of qualified resident firms through the New Mexico Inspection of Public
Records Act, which allows anyone to view public documents.
In general, non-resident firms tend to be local despite their status, and resident firms tend to be more
prevalent in the data. Most non-resident firms have main offices within the state (60 percent of bidders and
64 percent of planholders), while only a small number of non-resident firms have main offices outside of states
bordering New Mexico (15 percent of bidders and 12 percent of planholders). Out of the 110 different firms
observed in the data, 66 firms are residents and 44 firms are non-residents.
II.(iii). Descriptive Statistics
[Place Table I approximately here]
Table I summarizes the project and firm characteristics. For each contract, I observe the following project
characteristics: the engineer’s estimated cost, the number of projected working days, the nature and location
of the work, the number of licenses required, the length in miles, and the number of bidders and planholders.
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Additionally, I observe the number of subprojects10 as well as any Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE)
participation goals. I observe residency status, bids, and entry decisions at the firm level.
The top panel of Table I summarizes the estimated costs, bids, winning bids, number of potential entrants,
number of actual entrants, and percent of resident winners. Relative to federally funded (or federal-aid)
projects, state-funded projects are slightly larger and more expensive on average. The average estimated cost
across state-funded projects exceeds that of federal-aid projects by about $949,000, while the bids received on
state-funded projects are about $1,401,000 higher than the bids received on federal-aid projects. The winning
bidder bids an average of $698,000 more on state-funded projects relative to federal-aid projects. Across the
potential and actual entrant dimensions, federal-aid and state-funded projects are similar, attracting around
the same average number of resident and non-resident planholders and bidders.
These set of descriptive statistics also indicate substantial differences in how both groups of bidders
enter and bid in auctions. Residents tend to bid less than non-residents and have less variance in their
bids. Residents are also less likely to enter auctions; on average, only about 3 of the possible 10 resident
planholders become actual bidders, while about 1 out of every 2 non-resident planholders becomes an actual
bidder. Despite the lower entry rates, residents win the majority of state and federal contracts.
The next two panels of Table I separate state and federal-aid projects by the type of road and the nature
of the work requested. I separate the nature of work into three mutually exclusive categories: road work,
bridge work, and other work. State and federal-aid projects are similar in terms of their location; roughly
50 to 60 percent of work is conducted on federal highways. State and federal-aid projects differ, however,
in the nature of the work requested. Relative to federal-aid projects, state-funded projects require less road
and bridge work, while work falling into neither of these categories is relatively higher.
The bottom panel of Table I lists the summary statistics on the remaining project-level observables. State
and federally funded contracts are, on average, similar across these observable dimensions with the exception
being the level of the DBE participation goal. New Mexico does not specify DBE participation goals on its
state-funded projects, which explains the lack of DBE participation goals observed on state projects in the
data.
10A subproject is a smaller portion of the main project. For example, if a roadway rehabilitation project requires the
installation of a fence, the fence installation would be a subproject of the main roadway rehabilitation project. For an example
of project and subproject descriptions in the data, see the appendix.
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III. THEORETICAL MODEL
This section provides the theoretical foundation by which I analyze the market for NMDOT construction
contracts. In order to preserve the main institutional features, I model New Mexico’s market for highway
construction contracts as a first-price, sealed-bid procurement auction with asymmetric bidders, affiliated
private values, and endogenous entry. The model proceeds in two stages as in Levin and Smith [1994],
Krasnokutskaya and Seim [2011], and Li and Zhang [2015]. In the first stage, potential resident and non-
resident bidders decide whether to pay the entry cost and participate in the auction. Bidders will enter if
their expected profits from participation exceed their costs of entry. In the New Mexico setting, the entry
cost represents the effort required to gather information about the project and the opportunity cost of time,
which is analogous to reading the invitation for bids and requesting project information. In the second stage,
bidders learn the identity and number of actual competitors, draw their project costs from a potentially
affiliated distribution, and submit a bid for the project.
III.(i). Affiliation
I model the possibility of project cost dependence across firms through affiliation. First introduced into
auctions by Milgrom and Weber [1982], affiliation can arise as a result of shared subcontractors and suppliers.
Theoretically, affiliation describes the relationship between two or more random variables; if two or more
random variables are affiliated, then they exhibit some form of positive dependence. de Castro [2010] shows
that affiliation is a sufficient condition for positive correlation, so affiliation can roughly be interpreted as a
stronger form of positive correlation.11 Formally, affiliation is defined as follows:
Definition. The density function f : [c, c]
n → R+ is affiliated if f (c) f (c′) ≤ f (c ∧ c′) f (c ∨ c′), where
c ∧ c′ = (min {c1, c′1} , ...,min {cn, c′n}) and c ∨ c′ = (max {c1, c′1} , ...,max {cn, c′n}).
In a procurement setting, affiliation in project costs means that when a firm draws a high project cost, it
is more likely that competing firms also have drawn high project costs. Note that affiliation essentially gives
bidders extra information on the opponent’s project costs, which is plausible if bidders are located close to
each other and share similar subcontractors.
Affiliation is also the key modeling assumption that explains the correlations across bids observed in
the data. Other studies such as Krasnokutskaya and Seim [2011], Athey et al. [2011], and Athey et al.
[2013] explain these correlations under the independent private value paradigm with unobserved auction
11See de Castro [2010] for a detailed discussion on the relationship between affiliation and other notions of positive dependence.
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heterogeneity. While similar in explaining the observed bidding patterns, these two approaches have distinct
implications on how firms bid and therefore on how bid preferences affect auctions; a firm’s own cost realization
impacts their belief about other firms’ costs under affiliation but not under independence. In the data, each
project has an engineer’s estimate, which contains a detailed break down of each project’s tasks. Since
the engineer’s estimate together with the other observed project characteristics explain a large part of the
variation in observed bids, I treat affiliation as the prime explanation for correlations across bids.12
III.(ii). Environment
Turning to the bidding environment, NR potential resident bidders and NNR potential non-resident bidders
compete in a first-price, sealed-bid procurement auction for the completion of one indivisible construction
project. Resident and non-resident bidders are risk neutral and draw entry costs, ki, independently from the
distribution Gmk (·), where m ∈ {R,NR} denotes whether firm i is a resident (R) or a non-resident (NR).
Firms draw their project costs, ci, from the joint distribution Fc(·, . . . , ·) with support [c, c]n, where n is the
total number of actual bidders. The marginal distribution for a bidder of group m is Fmc (·), which allows for
heterogeneity in the group-specific marginal distributions. Joint project cost distributions can be affiliated,
but I assume that project costs are independent of entry costs.13 These distributions are common knowledge
to every potential bidder.
Additionally, resident firms in auctions funded exclusively by the state of New Mexico receive a discount
of δ on their submitted bid. In terms of the model, the auctioneer will lower every resident bid by a factor
of (1− δ) when comparing it against a non-resident bid in a preference auction, so a resident firm will win if
its bid is less than the lowest competing resident bid and the lowest competing non-resident bid scaled by a
factor of 11−δ . The value of the discount is 5 percent for New Mexico residents in preference auctions.
III.(iii). Bidding
After bidders learn their project costs and the number of actual entrants, bidders submit their bids to
complete the construction contract. Heterogeneity in residency status along with bid discounting leads to
group-symmetric equilibria as in Krasnokutskaya and Seim [2011], where bidders of each group m follow
12In other environments where unobserved auction heterogeneity may dominate affiliation, econometric methods developed in
Krasnokutskaya [2011] and empirical methods found in Hong and Shum [2002] and Haile et al. [2006] would be more suitable.
Balat [2016] discusses identification in environments with both affiliation and unobserved project heterogeneity.
13This assumption implies that bidders do not base entry decisions on their realized project costs. Samuleson [1985] discusses
the opposite case where bidders are completely informed of their project costs prior to entry, and Roberts and Sweeting [2010]
discuss the intermediate case where bidders are partially informed. Sweeting and Bhattacharya [2015] study various auction
designs when entry is endogenous and selective in the sense that bidders with higher valuations are more likely to enter. Within
a procurement setting, Li and Zheng [2009] provide evidence that supports a model in which bidders are initially uninformed
prior to entry.
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potentially different monotone and differentiable bid functions βm(·) : [c, c]→ R+. In particular, a bidder of
group m solves the following optimization problem to determine the equilibrium bids:
pi(ci;nNR, nR) = max
bi
(bi − ci) Pr
(
(1− δ)DR bi < Bj ∀j ∈ NR, (1− δ)−DNR bi < Bl ∀l ∈ R | ci
)
,
where pi(ci;nNR, nR) is the value function, bi is the bid choice of bidder i, Bj and Bl are the competing
bids, Dm is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if firm i is associated with group m and
zero otherwise, and δ = 0 if the auction is not a preference auction. The objective function illustrates
how firms view preference when submitting a bid. For positive δ, preference increases the probability of a
resident beating a non-resident bidder without requiring the resident bidder to submit a lower bid. Residents
therefore have a higher probability of winning a preference auction with the same choice of bi relative to a
non-preference auction yet face the same payment if they win.14
Let nm denote the actual number of bidders in group m. Furthermore, let F¯c−i(c1, . . . , ci−1, ci+1, . . . , cn |
ci) = Pr (C1 > c1, . . . , Ci−1 > ci−1, Ci+1 > ci+1, . . . , Cn > cn | ci) be the joint survival function of project cost
signals (C1, . . . , Ci−1, Ci+1, . . . , Cn) without bidder i conditional on her signal, and define β−1NR
(
(1− δ)DR bi
)
=(
β−1NR
(
(1− δ)DR bi
)
, . . . , β−1NR
(
(1− δ)DR bi
))
∈ RnNR−DNR as a vector that collects the inverse bid func-
tions of non-residents and β−1R
(
(1− δ)−DNR bi
)
=
(
β−1R
(
(1− δ)−DNR bi
)
, . . . , β−1R
(
(1− δ)−DNR bi
))
∈
RnR−DR as a vector that collect the inverse bid function of residents. The first-order conditions that charac-
terizes the optimal bid are then given by
0 = (bi − ci)
×
[
nNR−DNR∑
j=1
F¯c−i,j
(
β−1NR
(
(1− δ)DR bi
)
,β−1R
(
(1− δ)−DNR bi
)
| ci
)
× β−1NR,1
(
(1− δ)DR bi
)
(1− δ)DR
+
n−1∑
j=nNR−DNR+1
F¯c−i,j
(
β−1NR
(
(1− δ)DR bi
)
,β−1R
(
(1− δ)−DNR bi
)
| ci
)
× β−1R,1
(
(1− δ)−DNR bi
)
(1− δ)−DNR
]
+ F¯c−i
(
β−1NR
(
(1− δ)DR bi
)
,β−1R
(
(1− δ)−DNR bi
)
| ci
)
,
where F¯c−i,j (·, . . . , · | ci) is the partial derivative of the conditional survival function with respect to the
14This intuition assumes that all else (opposing bids, object being auctioned, etc.) is equal.
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j’th coordinate, β−1NR,1 (·) is the partial derivative of a non-resident’s inverse bid function with respect to its
first coordinate, and β−1R,1 (·) is the partial derivative of a resident’s inverse bid function with respect to its
first coordinate. These first-order conditions form a system of differential equations that characterize the
equilibrium bids.
A complete characterization of the bidding equilibrium requires one to specify boundary conditions. Fol-
lowing Hubbard and Paarsch [2009] and Krasnokutskaya and Seim [2011], I set four group-specific boundary
conditions.
The left boundary condition requires that bidders who draw the lowest project cost submit the same bid
while accounting for the level of the bid discount. Let b be the common low bid. The left boundary conditions
for both groups of bidders is as follows:
1. Resident left boundary:
β−1R
(
b
(1− δ)
)
= c.
2. Non-resident left boundary:
β−1NR (b) = c.
The right boundary condition restricts bidding behavior at the highest possible project cost draw. This
condition can loosely be interpreted as bidders who draw the highest project cost bid their project costs while
making any necessary adjustments for possible discounts received by competing bidders. The right boundary
condition for both groups of bidders is as follows:
3. Resident right boundary:
β−1R
(
b
)
= c,
where b = c if nR > 1 and b = arg maxb [(b− c) Pr ((1− δ) b < bj ∀j ∈ NR | c)] if nR = 1. That is
to say, if there is only one resident firm bidding on a project, it will choose a bid that maximizes its
expected profits since the discount may lower its bid enough to be competitive with the non-resident
firms.
4. Non-resident right boundary:
11
β−1NR (c) = c.
Observe that bid preference introduces another equilibrium feature mentioned by Hubbard and Paarsch
[2009] and Krasnokutskaya and Seim [2011]. In particular, if a non-resident firm draws a project cost
c ∈ [(1− δ) b, c], then it also bids its project cost. Note that, as long as there is at least one competing
resident bidder, a project cost draw in this region for a non-resident will never win the auction, yielding
a payoff of zero as long as the non-resident firm does not bid below its cost. Since bidders are indifferent
between not winning an auction and winning an auction with a bid equal to their cost, this assumption can
be made without changing the equilibrium payoffs.
Existence and uniqueness of a bidding equilibrium are key in empirically implementing these types of
auctions. Existence establishes that there is, in fact, a solution to the auction, while uniqueness establishes
that the bidders are playing one equilibrium as opposed to potentially multiple different equilibria. Reny and
Zamir [2004] show that a monotone pure strategy equilibrium exists in a more general setting than this type
of auction. Uniqueness follows from Li and Zhang [2015] for the class of joint project cost distributions that
I use in this paper.
III.(iv). Entry
In the entry stage, firms make participation decisions based on their knowledge of the number of potential
entrants of each group, their knowledge of their own entry cost, and their knowledge of the distributions of
project costs and entry costs. Firms calculate ex-ante expected profits as
Πm (Nm, N−m) =
∑
nm−1⊆Nm,n−m⊆N−m
∫ c
c
pi (ci;nm, n−m) dFmc (ci) Pr (nm − 1, n−m | Nm, N−m) ,
where the −m subscript indicates the bidders not affiliated with the group of bidder i and Fmc (·) is the
marginal project cost distribution of group m.15 These profits are only a function of the observed number of
potential bidders since the only payoff-relevant information available to a given firm before entry is the number
of potential bidders and its entry cost. Also note that the subscript is group specific since members of the
same group face the same ex-ante expected profits. The entry cost distribution determines the group-specific
15When computing these profits, there is a case where no competing bidders enter the auction. This case is problematic since
the NMDOT does not explicitly post a reserve price. The NMDOT does, however, reserve the right to reject all bids if the
lowest price is excessively high. To capture this power to reject bids, I follow Krasnokutskaya and Seim [2011] in assuming that
firms compete against the government (which is modeled as a resident bidder) when faced with no other competition.
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equilibrium entry probabilities, which I denote as pm. That is,
pm = Pr (ki < Πm) = G
m
k (Πm) ,
where Gmk (·) is the marginal distribution of entry costs for a bidder in group m. The above equality
follows from the fact that a firm’s beliefs about its competitors’ entry probabilities must be consistent with
their actual entry probabilities in equilibrium. An application of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem demonstrates
the existence of the threshold probabilities pm.
16 Note here that the existence and uniqueness results from
the bidding equilibrium still hold after entry since bidders behave as if entry was exogenous upon entering.
IV. THE COPULA REPRESENTATION
One difficulty in implementing auction models with affiliation is dealing with the joint cost distribution.
To overcome this difficulty, I rely on copula methods developed by Hubbard, Li, and Paarsch [2012]. Cop-
ulas are an expression of the joint distribution of random variables as a function of the marginals. Formally, if
c1, c2, . . . , cn are n possibly correlated random variables with marginal distributions F
1
c (c1), F
2
c (c2), . . . , F
n
c (cn)
respectively, then the joint distribution can be written as a function of the marginal distributions as
Fc (c1, c2, . . . , cn) = C
[
F 1c (c1) , F
2
c (c2) , . . . , F
n
c (cn)
]
,
where C [·, . . . , ·] is the copula function.
The particular type of copula I use to model the joint cost distribution of resident and non-resident bidders
is a Clayton copula. This type of copula has the following closed-form representation:
C
[
F 1c (c1) , F
2
c (c2) , . . . , F
n
c (cn)
]
=
(
n∑
i=1
F ic (ci)
−θ − n+ 1
)− 1θ
,
where θ ∈ [−1,∞) \ {0} is the dependence parameter. Besides having a tractable representation, Clayton
copulas are useful in the sense that affiliation only requires θ to be greater than zero.17 Moreover, θ has the
nice interpretation that a higher value of θ implies a higher degree of affiliation between random variables,
so θ contains all of the relevant information on cost dependence.18
16Uniqueness, however, is not guaranteed and must be verified through simulation.
17For a formal proof of this statement, see Mu¨ller and Scarsini [2005].
18A limitation of the Clayton copula, however, is that there is only one parameter governing the affiliation between both
groups of bidders. If residents and non-residents have different degrees of affiliation between them, then this setup may not
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Since I study procurement auctions in this paper, I must model the conditional survival function. For this
reason, I use two results from Hubbard, Li, and Paarsch [2012] to construct an expression for the conditional
survival function using copulas:
Result 1:
The survival function, F¯c(c1, c2, . . . , cn), can be written as
F¯c(c1, c2, . . . , cn) = Pr(C1 > c1, C2 > c2 . . . , Cn > cn)
= 1−
n∑
i=1
Pr(Ci < ci) +
∑
1≤i<j≤n
Pr(Ci < ci, Cj < cj)
− · · ·+ (−1)n Pr(C1 < c1, C2 < c2 . . . , Cn < cn).
This result provides an expression of the survival function in terms of the cumulative density function
(CDF), which has a copula representation. Let S
[
1− F 1c (c1) , 1− F 2c (c2) , . . . , 1− Fnc (cn)
]
denote the sur-
vival copula evaluated at the survival marginals. The first result shows that the survival copula can be
expressed as
S
[
1− F 1c (c1) , 1− F 2c (c2) , . . . , 1− Fnc (cn)
]
= 1−
n∑
i=1
C
[
F ic (ci)
]
+
∑
1≤i<j≤n
C
[
F ic (ci) , F
j
c (cj)
]
− · · ·+ (−1)nC [F 1c (c1) , . . . , Fnc (cn)] .
Result 2:
Pr(C2 > c2 . . . , Cn > cn | c1) = S1
[
1− F 1c (c1) , 1− F 2c (c2) , . . . , 1− Fnc (cn)
]
, where S1 [·, . . . , ·] is the
partial derivative of the survival copula with respect to the first coordinate.
Result 2 shows that the conditional survival copula is equivalent to the partial derivative of the full
survival copula with respect to the conditioning argument.
Given these two results, the second stage profits of bidder 1 can be rewritten using copulas as
pi(c1;nNR, nR) = max
b1
(b1 − c1)
× S1
[
1− Fm1c (c1) , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, . . . , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)
, . . . , 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)]
,
capture those differences. To assess whether this is the case for resident and non-resident bidders in New Mexico, I calculate and
compare the intraclass correlations between bids for residents and non-residents, where the classes are the separate auctions.
I find that the correlations across bids for the two groups of bidders do not differ substantially from each other or the entire
sample, suggesting that a single parameter governing all affiliation is reasonable.
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wherem1 is bidder 1’s group, F
m
c is the marginal distribution of a bidder in groupm, β
−1
NR = β
−1
NR
(
(1− δ)DR b1
)
,
and β−1R = β
−1
R
(
(1− δ)−DNR b1
)
. The first-order conditions are now given by
S1
[
1− Fm1c (c1) , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, . . . , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)
, . . . , 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)]
= (b1 − c1)
[
(nNR −DNR)β−1NR,1 (1− δ)DR fNRc
(
β−1NR
)
(1)
×S12
[
1− Fm1c (c1) , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, . . . , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)
, . . . , 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)]
+ (nR −DR)β−1R,1 (1− δ)−DNR fRc
(
β−1R
)
×S1n
[
1− Fm1c (c1) , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, . . . , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)
, . . . , 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)] ]
,
where fmc (·) is the marginal probability density function (PDF) associated with the marginal CDF Fmc (·).
V. A SIMULATION STUDY
Before moving into the estimation methodology and to illustrate the possible effects affiliation can have on bid
preference auctions at the bidding stage, I conduct simulations over a range of different affiliated distributions
with a fixed number of entrants. This section presents the results from those simulation studies. Here, I
parameterize the group-specific marginal project cost distributions as beta distributions in order to remain
flexible with their shape; I set the copula joining these marginal distributions to a Clayton copula. Figure 1
shows the full set of marginal project cost distribution CDFs used in this analysis.
[Place Figure 1 approximately here]
I calculate bid functions in a variety of different environments. Except in a few special cases, the solution
to the system of equations in (1) together with the boundary conditions does not have a closed-form solution.
As a result, I approximate and invert each group’s inverse bid functions with a modified version of the third
algorithm found in Bajari [2001], which essentially approximates inverse bid functions using polynomials.19
I set the remaining simulation parameters to mirror a common New Mexico preference auction. I set the
number of actual bidders to a commonly observed configuration of one non-resident bidder and three resident
bidders, and I set the discount to New Mexico’s current five percent level. For each marginal project cost
distribution, I approximate bid functions under independence and affiliation, where affiliation is calculated
19See the appendix for a detailed explanation of how I numerically approximate the bid functions.
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by setting the affiliation parameter to 1. This parameter choice means that project costs are 33.3 percent
more likely to be concordant than discordant.20 I denote independence by an affiliation parameter of 0.
V.(i). Equal Strength Bidders
As a start, I study a case where both groups of bidders are of equal strength. Let αR and βR be the parameters
characterizing the resident beta distribution, and let αNR and βNR be the parameters characterizing the
non-resident beta distribution. I construct the equal strength case by setting each group’s beta distribution
parameters to αR, αNR = 1 and βR, βNR = 1 so that project costs are symmetric. This parameterization is
equivalent to a uniform cost distribution. Observe that in this case, the preference is the sole driver of any
asymmetry between bidders. Figure 2 displays the equilibrium bid functions corresponding to these marginal
project cost distributions.
[Place Figure 2 approximately here]
Several patterns emerge from these simulations:
1. With affiliation, a bidder with a low project cost bids more aggressively relative to independence.
Intuitively, competing bidders are more likely to have similar project costs when the joint distribution
is affiliated. A bidder with a low project cost draw is then more likely to face competitors with low
project costs and will, therefore, bid more aggressively relative to independence.
2. For higher project cost draws, bidders tend to bid less aggressively relative to independence. Note that
a bidder who draws a high project cost will believe that other bidders also have high project costs
when these costs are affiliated, but her beliefs will not change when these costs are independent. This
difference in beliefs will affect equilibrium bids because a bidder bids less aggressively when she believes
her competition has higher project costs.
3. Affiliation can affect the separation in resident and non-resident bid functions caused by bid preferences.
Indeed, the simulations show that the common low bid for both groups of bidders decreases when project
costs become affiliated. The left boundary condition then implies that the common low bids are closer
together. For higher project cost draws, there is more separation under affiliation. This separation
20Concordance is similar to affiliation in that more concordant random variables exhibit a higher degree of positive dependence.
Formally, if (x1, y1) . . . (xn, yn) are n observations from random variables X and Y such that all values of xi and yi, i = 1 . . . n,
are unique, then a pair of observations (xi, yi) and (xj , yj), i 6= j, are concordant if xi > xj and yi > yj .
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comes from both groups of bidders bidding less aggressively and resident bidders receiving a preference
(which makes them bid even less aggressively).
V.(ii). A Weak Group and a Strong Group of Bidders
Next, I turn to a case where both groups of bidders differ in strength. For this case, the ‘weak’ bidders are
the resident bidders, and I set their beta distribution parameters to the previous configuration of αR = 1 and
βR = 1. The ‘strong’ bidders here are the non-resident bidders, and I set their beta distribution parameters
to αNR = 1 and βNR = 1.1. Note that this arrangement of distribution parameters generates a situation
where the resident project cost distribution first-order stochastically dominates the non-resident project cost
distribution, which means that residents are more likely to draw higher project costs. Figure 3 shows the
results from this case.
[Place Figure 3 approximately here]
Many of the same patterns observed in the equal strength bidder case appear in this case as well. Bidders
still bid more aggressively for low cost realizations and less aggressively for high cost realizations when their
joint project cost distribution is affiliated. The main difference here, especially when there is affiliation, is the
amount of separation due to bid preferences, and that difference is generated by the asymmetry in resident
and non-resident project costs. The idea here is that the resident marginal project cost distribution now
first-order stochastically dominates the non-resident marginal project cost distribution. Whether costs are
independent or affiliated, this asymmetry causes non-residents to bid less aggressively relative to the equal
strength case since non-residents are more likely to have lower project costs compared to residents. Affiliation
intensifies this effect in that affiliation causes residents and non-residents to draw from similar quantiles on
their respective distributions, so a low cost draw for a resident is likely to be even lower for a non-resident
relative to independence.21 As a result, non-residents bid closer to residents under affiliation.
21To illustrate this point with an example, suppose that a resident bidder draws a cost in the 10th percentile of her marginal
project cost distribution. Under affiliation, this draw means that competing bidders are more likely to draw their project
costs from the 10th percentile of their marginal distributions. Since the resident marginal distribution first-order stochastically
dominates the non-resident marginal distribution, the project cost corresponding to the 10th percentile of the resident marginal
distribution is higher than the project cost corresponding to the 10th percentile of the non-resident marginal distribution, so
that resident bidder would believe competing non-resident bidders have even lower project costs relative to the equal strength
case.
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V.(iii). A High Variance Group and a Low Variance Group of Bidders
The final case I consider in this section is a case where each group of bidders has different levels of dispersion
in their project cost distributions. This case is motivated by the observation that non-resident bidders have
more variable bids in the data, which might be a result of more disperse costs. In constructing this case,
I set the resident beta distribution parameters to αR = 1.5 and βR = 1.5 while fixing the non-resident
beta distribution parameters at αNR = 1 and βNR = 1. Observe that this composition of distribution
parameters implies that residents and non-residents have the same mean project cost, but non-residents have
more variance in their project costs relative to residents. Figure 4 presents the bid functions corresponding
to these distributions.
[Place Figure 4 approximately here]
There are a few differences between this asymmetry’s effect on equilibrium bidding relative to the previous
cases. Perhaps the most visible difference is that resident bidders bid much more aggressively for low project
cost draws and slightly less aggressively for high project cost draws with affiliation. Intuitively, residents and
non-residents become more likely to draw from the same quantiles with affiliation. When residents have less
variable project costs than non-residents, this property of affiliation means that high draws for residents likely
lead to even higher draws for non-residents, while low draws for residents likely lead to even lower draws for
non-residents. As a result, residents bid less aggressively for high project cost draws and more aggressively
for low project cost draws.
These results, although conditional on a fixed number of entrants, have implications for entry decisions.
Bidders who face more (less) aggressive bidding conditional on entry due to affiliation are less (more) likely
to enter because their expected profits are lower (higher). Affiliation can, therefore, alter entry decisions
within and across groups of bidders, which can change the procurement costs and the composition of actual
bidders.
VI. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ESTIMATION
While the theoretical model provides a foundation for understanding the market for NMDOT procurement
contracts, it does not lend itself to estimation without further distributional assumptions. This section
outlines the distributional assumptions needed to produce an empirical model that can be estimated from
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the data. First, I discuss the distributional assumptions; then, I lay out the estimation routine. I end
this section with a discussion of how the parameters are parametrically identified through the estimation
procedure.
VI.(i). Parametric Specifications
The size of the data requires that I take a parametric approach in estimating the theoretical model. For this
purpose, I assume that an auction, indexed by w, is characterized by the vector of observables (xw, zw, nRw,
nNRw, NRw, NNRw), where xw is a vector of auction-level observables that affect project costs, zw is a vector
of auction-level observables that affect entry costs, nRw and nNRw are the observed number of resident
and non-resident entrants respectively, and NRw and NNRw are the advertised number of potential resident
entrants and non-resident entrants respectively. The group-specific marginal distributions of project costs
conditional on xw are given by F
m
c (· | xw), and the group-specific marginal distribution of entry costs
conditional on zw are given by G
m
k (· | zw).
To address entry, I require parametric assumptions on the probability firms assign to the entry of compet-
ing firms. To this end, I model entry probabilities, pmw (xw, zw, NRw, NNRw), as a binomial distributions:
Pr (nRw, nNRw | xw, zw, NRw, NNRw) = Pr (nRw | xw, zw, NRw, NNRw)× Pr (nNRw | xw, zw, NRw, NNRw) ,
where
Pr (nmw | xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw) =
 Nmw
nmw
 (pmw)nmw (1− pmw)Nmw−nmw ,
and
(2) pmw = G
m
k (Πmw (xw, Nmw, N−mw) | zw) .
This assumption on entry probabilities means that each firm calculates the probability that firms in their
group and firms in their competing group enter the auction given their knowledge of the project and entry
cost distributions. Observe that equation (2) comes from the equilibrium condition that beliefs are consistent.
A complication that arises in empirically implementing the theoretical model is the presence of the inverse
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bid function in the first-order conditions of the second-stage bidding problem. This complication would require
that the inverse bid functions be approximated for every set of second-stage parameter guesses. Instead,
this paper relies on approximations based on indirect methods introduced by Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong
[2000, henceforth abbreviated GPV] further extended by Krasnokutskaya [2011] for the case of unobserved
auction heterogeneity and Hubbard, Li, and Paarsch [2012] for the case of affiliation using copulas. In
particular, I infer a firm’s cost from the observed bid distribution by noting that Fmb (b) = F
m
c
(
β−1m (b)
)
and
fmb (b) = f
m
c
(
β−1m (b)
)
β−1m,1 (b).
22 Making these substitutions in the first-order conditions of the second stage
bidding problem obviates the need for estimating the inverse bid function when determining project costs.
As a result, the empirical model will now focus on the marginal distribution of bids, Fmb (· | xw), instead of
the marginal distribution of project costs, Fmc (· | xw).
I place the final set of distributional assumptions on the distribution of bids and entry costs. In order to
have positive bids, allow for affiliation, and allow for heterogeneity across resident and non-resident bidders,
I model the log of the submitted bids as follows:
log (biw) = x
′
iwβ + 
mi
iw ,
where
miiw | xiw ∼ N
(
0, exp (y′iwσ)
2
)
,
(
NR1w , . . . , 
NR
nNRw, 
R
nNR+1w, . . . , 
R
nNR+nRw | xiw
)
≡ w ∼ Fw ,
Fw = C
[
FNR1w , . . . , FNRnNRw
, FRnNR+1
, . . . , FRnNR+nR
]
,
xiw is the set of auction-level observables with a residency status indicator variable for bidder i, and yiw
is a subset of the xiw covariates also containing the resident indicator. Likewise, I assume that the entry
costs take the following form:
log (kiw) = z
′
iwγ + u
mi
iw ,
where
umiw | ziw ∼ N
(
0, exp (v′iwα)
2
)
,
ziw is the set of auction-level observables with an indicator for residency status, and viw is a subset of
22For a complete description on how to approximate the inverse bid functions using GPV [2000] in this setting, see the
appendix.
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the ziw covariates that also includes the resident indicator.
VI.(ii). Estimation
I estimate the parameters of the empirical model using generalized method of moments (GMM). In using
GMM, I match the theoretical predictions of the empirical model to the data by selecting the parameter
values that minimize the weighted distance between model moments and data moments. This subsection
gives a general overview of how I construct and use the moment conditions in estimation. For a more detailed
explanation on how to derive the moments from the empirical model, see the appendix.
I use the first set of moment conditions to identify the parameters of the bid distribution. These moment
conditions are
(3) E [xiw (log (biw)− x′iwβ)] = 0
and
(4) E [yiw (log (biw)− x′iwβ) (log (biw)− x′iwβ)] = E
[
yiw exp (y
′
iwσ)
2
]
.
Observe that equation (4) yields the standard deviation parameter, σ, and equations (3) and (4) yield
the mean parameter, β.
In addition to estimating the parameters of the marginal distributions, the affiliation parameter, θ, must
also be estimated through the moment conditions of the model. I estimate this parameter by relying on
methods developed by Oh and Patton [2013] to estimate copulas using method of moments. In particular,
one can summarize the degree of dependence between two random variables by a statistic called Kendall’s
tau. This statistic’s equation for Clayton copulas together with its closed-form solution motivate the following
moment condition:
(5)
θ
θ + 2
= 4E
[
C
[
Φ
(
log (biw)− x′iwβ
exp (y′iwσ)
)
,Φ
(
log (bjw)− x′jwβ
exp
(
y′jwσ
) )]]− 1 i 6= j,
where Φ (·) is the standard normal CDF.
I use the last set of moment conditions to identify the parameters of the unobserved entry cost distribution.
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These moment conditions are
(6) E [nmw] =
∫
NmwpmwdF (xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw) ,
E
[
n2mw
]
=
∫
Nmwpmw (1− pmw) +N2mwp2mwdF (xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw) ,(7)
E
[
n3mw
]
=
∫
Nmwpmw
(
1− 3pmw + 3Nmwpmw + 2p2mw − 3Nmwp2mw(8)
+ N2mwp
2
mw
)
dF (xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw) ,
and
E
[
n4mw
]
=
∫
Nmwpmw
(
1− 7pmw + 7Nmwpmw + 12p2mw − 18Nmwp2mw + 6N2mwp2mw(9)
− 6p3mw + 11Nmwp3mw − 6N2mwp3mw +N3mwp3mw
)
dF (xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw) ,
where
pmw = G
m
k (Π (xw, Nmw, N−mw) | zw)
is the group-specific entry probability. I derive these moment conditions from the assumption that entry is
dictated by a joint binomial distribution, where the probabilities bidders assign to entry is consistent with
the actual entry probabilities.
VI.(iii). Parametric Identification
Given the intricacy of the model, I conclude this section with a brief discussion of the data features that
identify the model’s parameters. The parameters of the model are the mean and standard deviation param-
eters of the bid distribution, β and σ, the mean and standard deviation of the entry cost distribution, γ and
α, and the affiliation parameter, θ.
The data contains a number of different contracts, each with multiple bids. In the model, those bids
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correspond to equilibrium bidding under a first-price, sealed-bid procurement auction format, so I use the
first and second moments of those observed bids to identify the mean and standard deviation parameters of
the equilibrium bid distribution. Within contracts, bids can potentially be positively dependent conditional
on contract-level observables. I use this dependence to identify the affiliation parameter, which is measured
by Kendall’s tau in equation (5).23 Finally, I observe resident and non-resident bidders entering auctions at
different rates. In the model, firms enter if their cost of entry is smaller than their ex-ante expected profit.
Different entry rates, therefore, map to different distributions of entry costs, so I use the observed entry rates
to pin down the entry parameters.
VII. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This section presents the empirical findings from the NMDOT highway procurement data. I first display and
interpret the structural parameter estimates from the empirical model and the corresponding cost distribu-
tions. These estimates suggest affiliation among bidder project costs and higher entry costs for resident firms
relative to non-resident firms. I then assess the model’s fit to the data.
VII.(i). Structural Estimates
I use the estimated empirical model to disentangle strategic participation and bidding decisions. I use both
preference and non-preference auctions in estimation, but I drop projects with 20 or more planholders for
computational reasons – amounting to 1 state-funded project and 10 federally funded projects. I include the
number of planholders and the number of actual bidders as control variables in my bid distribution estimates
because those observables can potentially change the distribution of equilibrium bids. Additionally, I use a
rich set of project controls so that the correlation in submitted bids is primarily generated through affiliation
in costs as opposed to unobserved project heterogeneity. I include a group-specific indicator for residency
status in the set of control variables to allow for heterogeneity between resident and non-resident bidders.
[Place Table II approximately here]
Table II contains the parameter estimates for the bid distribution. The coefficients indicate that the
submitted bids vary according to a project’s size and observable characteristics. The coefficients also show
23Note here that a limitation of using bid dependence to identify affiliation is that any unobserved heterogeneity would also
be attributed to the affiliation parameter. As a result, the estimates from this paper should be viewed as an upper bound on
the affiliation parameter.
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statistically insignificant differences in how the two groups of bidders bid that varies depending on whether
the project is state or federally funded. Specifically, residents bid about 1.5 percent less than non-residents
on federal-aid projects and 5 percent more than non-residents on state projects.
The affiliation parameter estimate is positive and statistically significant, which indicates the presence
of affiliation in firm project costs. This estimate can be interpreted using Kendall’s tau as a measure of
concordance. In particular, the value of Kendall’s tau for the Clayton copula is τ = θθ+2 . Applying that
formula to the estimated affiliation parameter of θ = 0.893 results in a Kendall’s tau of 0.309, which means
that a given pair of project cost draws is 30.9 percent more likely to be concordant than discordant.
This tau estimate can be compared to others found in studies using a similar affiliated private value
framework. On one hand, the Kendall’s tau of 0.309 estimated here is higher than the tau of 0.06 estimated
by Li and Zhang [2015] for the case of timber sales auctions in Oregon, implying that the costs for firms
competing for NMDOT construction contracts are more concordant than the values of firms competing for
Oregon timer sales auctions. On the other hand, Hubbard, Li, and Paarsch [2012] estimate a tau of 0.655
using Michigan Department of Transportation data under the assumption that costs are drawn from a Clayton
copula. The difference between the Michigan and New Mexico tau estimates suggests that affiliation can vary
in prevalence across states for similar types of auctions.
In order to evaluate differences in the marginal resident and non-resident project costs, I use methods of bid
inversion developed by GPV [2000] on the estimated bid distributions. These methods use the equilibrium
bid distributions in conjunction with the first-order conditions on optimal bidding to back out the cost
associated with an observed bid. Heterogeneity in project characteristics will result in different marginal cost
distributions for each separate project in the data. To keep the analysis concise, I calculate resident and
non-resident marginal cost distributions for two types of projects: one project with the average characteristics
of a preference project and one project with the average characteristics of a non-preference project. For each
of these projects, I simulate and invert bids from the estimated marginal bid distributions to obtain costs
using the average number of resident and non-resident bidders as the number of participants and taking into
account the estimated affiliation parameter. I estimate the marginal project cost distribution using a kernel
density estimator with a normal kernel and optimal bandwidth, yielding a marginal cost CDF for both types
of bidders.
[Place Figure 5 approximately here]
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Figure 5 displays the different marginal project cost CDFs for the average preference and non-preference
project. As evidenced by the shape of the CDFs, and consistent with the observed marginal bid distributions,
non-residents have a more disperse project cost distribution than residents across projects. Also, no one
project cost distribution first-order stochastically dominates the other in any of the average projects, which
can lead to ambiguity in the ranking of resident and non-resident firms in terms of cost efficiency.
[Place Table III approximately here]
Turning to firm entry costs, Table III presents the estimated parameters for the log-normal entry cost
distribution. The entry parameters have the expected signs and magnitudes and suggest that there are
differences among resident and non-resident costs of entry. In particular, residents have higher average entry
costs compared to non-residents and more variance in these entry costs.24 In the data, a higher average entry
cost means that residents typically enter auctions less frequently than non-residents, and a higher variance for
residents means that the random part of the entry cost explains more of the resident entry patterns relative
to non-residents. A plausible explanation for these differences is that there may be a separate entry process
into planholder status that selects non-resident firms who have innately lower and less variable entry costs,
which is outside the scope of the data and model. The parameter estimates are nonetheless consistent with
the entry rates observed in the data.
VII.(ii). Model Fit
With the entry cost and equilibrium bid distributions estimated, I can now assess how well the model can
predict data outcomes. This exercise is crucial in understanding whether my parametric assumptions on
equilibrium bidding are appropriate for New Mexico’s highway procurement data.
I investigate model fit by simulating outcomes under fixed and endogenous entry. For simulations where
entry is fixed, I use the bid distribution estimates to draw bids according to the observed number of resident
and non-resident participants. When entry is endogenous, I use the entry cost estimates to simulate entry
and bidding in two steps. I first draw each group of bidders’ entry costs and compare them to their expected
profits from entry; firms with entry costs lower than their expected profits enter. Then, I draw bids from
each group’s equilibrium bid distribution given the number of entrants. My simulations are based on the data
24Recall that these parameter estimates are the mean and variance of the natural logarithm of the entry costs. Let µ be the
mean of the natural logarithm of the entry costs, and let σ be the standard deviation of the natural logarithm of the entry
costs. The mean of the actual distribution of entry costs is then calculated as exp
(
µ+ σ
2
2
)
, while the variance is calculated as(
exp
(
σ2
)− 1) exp (2µ+ σ2).
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used in estimation, which does not have auctions with 20 or more planholders. As a result, the outcomes
from the actual data will be slightly different than the statistics reported in Table I.
Table IV reports the average data outcomes and the average model outcomes under fixed and endogenous
entry. I obtain standard errors with a bootstrapping procedure, where I re-simulate the average auction out-
comes using the estimated bid and entry cost distributions and calculate standard errors from the bootstrap
repetitions.
[Place Table IV approximately here]
In general, I find that the model does well in predicting the bidding and entry patterns observed in
state-funded and federally funded projects. Note here that not all outcomes were targeted in estimation;
the average winning bid and the percent of resident winners are moments of the data that were not used in
estimation. The fit of the model to these moments demonstrates the model’s flexibility in accounting for these
data patterns. I do find that the predicted percentage of resident bidders is about 10 percentage points lower
than the actual percentage on state projects with endogenous entry, though. That pattern arises because the
model underpredicts the number of resident entrants on state projects.
VIII. COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS
I now use the structural parameter estimates to run counterfactual policy experiments. Given the computa-
tional burden associated with calculating equilibrium bid functions, I focus on a representative construction
project qualifying for preference in the data.25 I first describe how I simulate the counterfactuals and then
explore how affiliation and bid preferences affect bidding under fixed participation. As a final point, I com-
pare bidder responses to different discount levels under the estimated level of affiliation and independence,
allowing for endogenous entry decisions.
VIII.(i). Simulation Method
I simulate counterfactual bidding and entry in a number of different steps. First, I obtain a kernel density
estimate of the underlying marginal project cost distributions, FRc and F
NR
c , by inverting a large number of
25To construct this project, I take the average of all numerical observables on projects qualifying for preference as the
representative project characteristics. For categorical variables, I use the most common category as the representative category.
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bids drawn from the estimated bid distributions by using GPV [2000].26 These group-specific cost distribu-
tions are primitives of the model and are fixed across all counterfactual policies and affiliation levels. Next, I
approximate and invert the group-specific inverse bid functions using the modified third algorithm of Bajari
[2001]. Different discount levels will result in different equilibrium bid functions, so I recalculate the bid
functions every time the discount changes. I use the estimated bid functions and project cost distributions
to simulate group-specific ex-ante profits, and, when entry is endogenous, I simulate entry decisions by com-
paring draws from the estimated entry cost distribution and the simulated ex-ante profits. For entrants, I
draw project costs from an affiliated cost distribution using methods described in Marshall and Olkin [1988],
and I apply the bid functions to the costs to determine the counterfactual bids.
The average number of resident and non-resident planholders are similar for preference auctions and non-
preference auctions in the data, suggesting that the number of potential entrants may not be sensitive to the
discount. For this reason, I set the number of potential entrants to the average preference auction level of
10 resident and 2 non-resident bidders for the auction simulations across discount levels in section VIII.(iii).,
but the simulated number of entrants can vary given draws of the entry costs. I simulate a total of 10,000
auctions for each grid point in a grid of discount levels to generate the auction outcomes.
VIII.(ii). Affiliation, Bid Preferences, and Optimal Bidding
As a first step in understanding the interplay between affiliation and bid preferences in New Mexico’s auctions,
I use the numerical methods to approximate bid functions under fixed participation and varying degrees of
preference and cost dependence. The bid functions use the cost distributions and the average number of par-
ticipants associated with the representative preference project, comparing bids under the estimated affiliation
parameter with counterfactual bids under independence. To investigate the impact of bid preferences, I com-
pare bid functions across auctions with the 5 percent preference policy and auctions without any preference.
Figure 6 presents the equilibrium bid functions.27
[Place Figure 6 approximately here]
26Note that the marginal project cost distribution will depend on the number of bidders and must be truncated to be consistent
with the theory. Following Athey et al. [2013], I use a common configuration of three resident entrants and one non-resident
entrant to determine the marginal project cost distribution. To deal with truncation, I truncate the support of the nonparametric
project cost distribution to an interval of 0.5 to 1.6 times the engineer’s estimate, corresponding to an interval with a lower
bound of $2,314,400 and an upper bound of $7,406,000. This particular interval is tight enough to avoid extended regions of the
project cost distribution with no density, which adversely affects bid function estimation, yet large enough to contain the vast
majority (about 98%) of inverted project cost draws.
27For an analysis of the error associated with these simulated bid functions, see the appendix.
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In general, the bid functions from New Mexico resemble the bid functions simulated with a high and
low variance group of bidders, so many of the observations from those simulations apply to firms bidding
on NMDOT construction contracts. In particular, affiliation, which can be seen by comparing the left two
panels and the right two panels of Figure 6, causes firms to bid more aggressively for lower project costs
and less aggressively for higher project costs independent of the level of preference since competing firms
are more likely to have similar project costs. Another feature of affiliation is that it changes the relative
aggression of resident and non-resident bidders. Comparing the top-left and top-right panels of Figure 6,
residents and non-residents behave almost as if the auction is symmetric when project costs are independent,
but when project costs become affiliated, bid functions become more distinct, with residents bidding more
aggressively than non-residents for lower project costs and non-residents bidding more aggressively than
residents for higher project costs. This change comes from the lower variance in the resident bid distribution;
since affiliation makes it more likely for groups of firms to draw project costs from the same quantiles of
their marginal distributions, low draws for a resident are likely to be even lower for a non-resident, while
high draws for a resident are likely to be even higher for a non-resident. Residents will, therefore, bid more
aggressively relative to non-residents for lower project costs and less aggressively for higher project costs.
Moving on to preference auctions, affiliation also affects how residents and non-residents adjust their bids
when there is bid discounting. Bid preferences drive a wedge between preferred and non-preferred bidders,
meaning that non-preferred bidders lower their bids and preferred bidders increase their bids relative to the
no preference case to account for discounting. The size of this wedge, which can be seen by comparing
the top two panels with the bottom two panels of Figure 6, depends on how aggressively firms bid and is
therefore tied to affiliation. Observe that when there are preferences in the independence case, the wedge
between resident and non-resident bidders is large for lower project costs and decreases for higher project
costs. When there is affiliation, the wedge is slightly smaller than independence for lower project costs (since
firms are bidding closer to their project costs) but becomes visibly larger for higher project cost draws. These
differences suggest that affiliation can affect how firms adjust bids with discounting.
VIII.(iii). Alternative Discount Rates, Efficiency, and the Role of Affiliation
Although New Mexico offers a five percent discount for its resident bidders, the discount level for preferred
bidders can vary across states and the type of good being procured. Here, I investigate how different discount
levels would affect New Mexico’s representative construction project. In order to assess the role of affiliation in
these auctions, I contrast firm bidding and participation under the estimated affiliation level against auctions
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where costs are assumed independent.
Figure 7 plots the how the procurement cost, the proportion of preferred winners, and the expected partic-
ipation changes across affiliation and discount levels. Procurement costs decrease initially and then increase
with increasing discount levels. This pattern comes from the composition of winning bidders: non-residents
tend to bid more aggressively than residents with more discounting but become a smaller proportion of the
winning bidders at higher discount levels. Relative to independence, affiliation leads to higher procurement
costs for all counterfactual discount levels because there is a wider range of project cost values where firms
bid further from their costs under affiliation as evidenced by Figure 6.
[Place Figure 7 approximately here]
The expected participation rate under affiliation is similar to the expected participation rate under inde-
pendence, but the drop-off in non-resident bidders and increase in resident bidders is more pronounced under
affiliation as the discount rises. I also find that the proportion of resident winners increases more dramati-
cally with affiliation. The intuition behind these results is that firm project costs become more similar with
affiliation, so higher discount levels are more likely to deter non-resident entry and encourage resident entry.
The increased number of resident entrants will then lead to a rise in the proportion of resident winners.
In addition to changing bidding and participation, changes in the discount can also alter economic ef-
ficiency. In the auction literature, an efficient auction is one that allocates an object to the firm with the
lowest cost. Although auctions with symmetric bidders will always be efficient, auctions with asymmetric
bidders, such as the ones considered in this paper, may not allocate objects efficiently. To gauge how efficiency
changes over discount levels, I calculate the average efficiency loss, which is the average simulated difference
in cost between the lowest cost bidder and the winning bidder, and the percent of inefficient auctions for all
potential and actual bidders at different discount levels. In order to measure affiliation’s effect on efficiency,
I calculate the efficiency statistics for auctions with the estimated level of affiliation and for auctions that
assume independence.
[Place Table V approximately here]
Table V breaks down the average procurement cost and efficiency loss over the counterfactual affiliation
and discount levels. New Mexico’s current policy is actually responsible for a small decrease in procurement
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costs: increasing the discount rate from 0 percent to its current level of 5 percent under affiliation decreases
the average procurement cost of the representative construction project by $17,330, which is a 0.4 percent
cost decrease. This decrease is relatively smaller than the bias associated with the independence assumption.
At the established 5 percent discount level, procurement costs are 3.3 percent higher than they would be if
costs were assumed independent.
Table V also illustrates the role of affiliation in the evaluation of economic efficiency. Starting with the
actual bidders, both the efficiency loss and the percent of inefficient auctions first increases and then decreases
under affiliation. In other words, the NMDOT can increase economic efficiency by increasing the discount
rate beyond 7.5 percent, which is counterintuitive given the wedge caused by bid preferences. A key driver
of this outcome is that higher discount levels tend to attract few non-resident bidders, so New Mexico can
essentially achieve higher efficiency by discouraging non-resident entrants, making auctions more symmetric
in the process. This observation becomes more apparent when comparing the affiliation outcomes with the
independence outcomes, which trend upward because there is less of an effect on non-resident entry.
Given that efficiency obtained through discouraging entry may not be desirable, I recalculate the efficiency
loss and the percent of inefficient auctions for all potential bidders. This measure of efficiency is less sensitive
to the composition of entrants. My efficiency results for all potential bidders suggest that there are small
differences in the percent of inefficient auctions under affiliation versus independence, but the difference in
efficiency loss is more striking. In particular, the efficiency loss for all potential bidders at New Mexico’s
five percent level is $288,240 (or 52.1 percent) lower with affiliation and remains more or less constant across
different discount levels. This result emerges from the increased similarity in project costs due to affiliation.
Taken together, these simulations suggest that New Mexico can use the discount rate as a mechanism to
increase the proportion of contracts won by resident bidders and alter the proportion of inefficient auctions and
procurement costs. Relative to the independence case, affiliation makes procurement more expensive but gives
discounting more leverage in increasing the proportion of preferred winners. For actual bidders, affiliation
tends to lead to a higher efficiency loss, while the efficiency loss for potential bidders is considerably smaller
with affiliation. These results illustrate the significance of accounting for affiliation in public procurement
with bid preferences.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I examine how affiliation affects procurement auctions in an environment where preferred
bidders have their bids discounted. My analysis is based on NMDOT construction contracts – a unique
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environment where resident bidders receive a 5 percent discount over non-resident bidders in construction
contracts using state funds. For the purpose of measuring affiliation and its effect on procurement, I develop
a two-stage theoretical model, where firms with potentially affiliated private project costs first decide entry
and then decide how much to bid. I implement the theoretical model through the use of copulas, capturing
affiliation through a tractable parametric assumption on the project cost distribution. I then estimate the
model via GMM by using moments from firm bidding and entry decisions.
My structural analysis establishes the presence of affiliation and demonstrates the importance of affiliation
in assessing procurement auctions with bid discounting. I find that the parameter measuring affiliation is
positive and significant, indicating that firms have affiliated project costs. My counterfactual policy simu-
lations reveal that affiliation can lead to differences in the proportion of preferred winners, the proportion
of inefficient auctions, and the efficiency losses generated from auctions with asymmetric bidders, and these
differences are contingent on the discount level. In fact, although New Mexico’s current policy is responsible
for a 0.4 percent decrease in procurement costs, I find that affiliation results in a 3.3 percent increase in
procurement costs relative to independence under New Mexico’s policy.
There are a couple of areas open to future research. In line with how the NMDOT awards preferences
in its procurement auctions, I focus on how affiliation can affect a particular type of preference policy where
preferred bidders have their bids discounted. An interesting research direction for the future would be to
explore how affiliation acts in settings where governments use other types of preference policies, such as group-
specific entry subsidies and reserve prices. Also, I have one parameter governing the affiliation between all
bidders. In other settings where the two groups of bidders are more distinct, a richer copula structure may
be a promising modeling possibility.
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Appendix A. Applying GPV to Auctions with Bid Preferences and
Affiliation
The first-order conditions in equation 1 can be rewritten as follows:
(10) c1 = b1 −
S1
[
1− Fm1c (c1) , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, . . . , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)
, . . . , 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)]
∂S1[1−Fm1c (c1),1−FNRc (β−1NR),...,1−FNRc (β−1NR),1−FRc (β−1R ),...,1−FRc (β−1R )]
∂b1
,
where
∂S1[1−Fm1c (c1),1−FNRc (β−1NR),...,1−FNRc (β−1NR),1−FRc (β−1R ),...,1−FRc (β−1R )]
∂b1
= (nNR −DNR)β−1NR,1 (1− δ)DR fNRc
(
β−1NR
)
×S12
[
1− Fm1c (c1) , 1− FNRc
(
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)
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(
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)
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(
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)
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(
β−1R
)]
+ (nR −DR)β−1R,1 (1− δ)−DNR fRc
(
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)
×S1n
[
1− Fm1c (c1) , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, . . . , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)
, . . . , 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)]
.
Define b˜ = (1− δ)DR b as the adjusted resident bid and bˆ = (1− δ)−DNR b as the adjusted non-resident
bid. These adjusted bids come from the opposing group of bidders calculating their optimal bid. Following
the methodology outlined in GPV [2000], the marginal CDF and PDF of costs can be expressed solely as
functions of the bids by noting that
FNRb
(
b˜
)
= FNRc
(
β−1NR
(
b˜
))
FRb
(
bˆ
)
= FRc
(
β−1R
(
bˆ
))
and
fNRb
(
b˜
)
= fNRc
(
β−1NR
(
b˜
))
β−1NR,1
(
b˜
)
fRb
(
bˆ
)
= fNRc
(
β−1R
(
bˆ
))
β−1R,1
(
bˆ
)
.
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Equation 10 can now be written as
c1 = b1 −
S1
[
1− Fm1b (b1) , 1− FNRb
(
b˜1
)
, . . . , 1− FNRb
(
b˜1
)
, 1− FRb
(
bˆ1
)
, . . . , 1− FRb
(
bˆ1
)]
∂S1[1−Fm1b (b1),1−FNRb (b˜1),...,1−FNRb (b˜1),1−FRb (bˆ1),...,1−FRb (bˆ1)]
∂b1
,
which expresses costs as the sum of the bid and a strategic markdown.
Appendix B. Solving for the Inverse Bid Functions
In order to solve for the inverse bid functions, I implement a modified version of the third algorithm found
in Bajari [2001]. In particular, I assume that the equilibrium inverse bid functions for bidders in group
m ∈ {R,NR} take on the following flexible functional form:
βˆ−1m (b) = b+
K∑
k=0
αm,k (b− b)k ,
where b is the unknown common low bid and {αm,k} , k = 0, . . . ,K are polynomial coefficients for bidders
in group m. The first-order conditions can now be expressed in terms of the polynomial approximations. Let
α be a vector that collects the polynomial coefficients of all groups of bidders, βˆ−1NR = βˆ
−1
NR
(
(1− δ)DR b
)
,
βˆ−1R = βˆ
−1
R
(
(1− δ)−DNR b
)
, and define Gm (b; b,α) as the first-order conditions with the approximated
inverse bid functions set equal to 0 at b:
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.
I evaluate these first-order conditions at T evenly spaced grid points within the intervals b ∈
[
b
(1−δ) , b
]
for residents and b ∈ [b, (1− δ) b] for non-residents. I determine b by the number of resident bidders: b = c if
nR > 1 and b = arg maxb [(b− c) Pr ((1− δ) b < bj ∀j ∈ NR | c)] if nR = 1. In order to capture the flat spot
in the inverse bid functions, I assume non-residents who have costs c ∈ [(1− δ) b, c] bid their cost. Taken
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together, the modified boundary conditions are
0 = βˆ−1R
(
b
(1− δ)
)
− c
0 = βˆ−1NR (b)− c
0 = βˆ−1R
(
b
)− c
0 = βˆ−1NR
(
(1− δ) b)− (1− δ) c
Define H (b;α) as
H (b;α) =
∑
m
T∑
t=1
Gm (bt; b,α) + w (T )
(
βˆ−1R
(
b
(1− δ)
)
− c
)
+ w (T )
(
βˆ−1NR (b)− c
)
+ w (T )
(
βˆ−1R
(
b
)− c)+ w (T )(βˆ−1NR ((1− δ) b)− (1− δ) c) ,
where I use the w (T ) terms as positive weights to get the boundary conditions to hold. Approximating
the inverse bid functions is equivalent to finding a vector of polynomial coefficients αˆ to minimize H (b;α).
In practice, I set the simulation parameters as follows. I use a cubic polynomial to approximate each
group’s inverse bid function (K = 3), and I set the number of grid points to 50 (T = 50). After performing
an extensive set of simulation studies, I find that this particular arrangement of grid points and polynomials
produces the most numerically stable results for the range of actual entrants possible during the counterfactual
simulations. I set the weighting function for the left boundary conditions to w (T ) = 48T under affiliation
and w (T ) = 26T when project costs are independent, and I use weighting functions of w (T ) = 17T under
affiliation and w (T ) = 500T under independence for the right boundary conditions. I determine these weights
by simulating the bid functions and choosing the lowest coefficient on T sufficient for the boundary conditions
to hold during the simulations.
Appendix C. Inverse Bid Function Accuracy
In order to evaluate the accuracy of the approximated inverse bid functions, I assess the first-order conditions
of the resident and non-resident bidding problem (or Gm (b; b,α)) on a grid of 100 bid points for the bid
functions displayed in Figure 6. In the model, equilibrium bidding requires that the first order conditions
are zero, so my approximations are more accurate if, when inserted into Gm (b; b,α), they yield values that
are near zero. Figure 8 shows the results; the vertical axis corresponds to the value of Gm (b; b,α), and the
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horizontal axis corresponds to the bid. To my knowledge, the literature has not yet established a benchmark
accuracy for the approximation of inverse bid functions with asymmetric bidders, but the results from this
paper’s approximations appear to be reasonable.
[Place Figure 8 approximately here]
Appendix D. Estimation Method
I estimate the parameters of the model with GMM, which essentially matches the predictions of the empirical
model to the moments of the data. This matching process requires assumptions on the bid distribution and
entry cost distribution, which were outlined in section VI.(i).. For completeness, I list these assumptions
below:
log (biw) = x
′
iwβ + 
mi
iw
miiw | xiw ∼ N
(
0, exp (y′iwσ)
2
)
(
NR1w , . . . , 
NR
nNRw, 
R
nNR+1w, . . . , 
R
nNR+nRw | xiw
)
≡ w ∼ Fw
Fw = C
[
FNR1w , . . . , FNRnNRw
, FRnNR+1
, . . . , FRnNR+nR
]
log (kiw) = z
′
iwγ + u
mi
iw
umiw | ziw ∼ N
(
0, exp (v′iwα)
2
)
.
I derive the first and second moment conditions from the first and second moments of the bidding distri-
bution:
E [xiw (log (biw)− x′iwβ)] = E [E [xiw (log (biw)− x′iwβ) | xiw]]
= E [xiwE [(log (biw)− x′iwβ) | xiw]] = E [xiwE [iw | xiw]] = 0
and
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E
[
yiwE
[
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′
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2
]
.
The corresponding empirical moments are
1
W
W∑
w=1
1
nRw + nNRw
nRw+nNRw∑
i=1
[xiw (log (biw)− x′iwβ)]
for the first moment and
1
W
W∑
w=1
1
nRw + nNRw
nRw+nNRw∑
i=1
[
yiw
(
log (biw)
2 − (x′iwβ)2 − exp (y′iwσ)2
)]
for the second moment.
I derive the next moment condition from the equation for Kendall’s tau for Clayton copulas. In particular,
when the dependence between random variables is modeled as a copula, Kendall’s tau takes the following
form:
(11) τij = 4E
[
C
[
F iu (ui) , F
j
u (uj)
]]− 1,
where τij is Kendall’s tau, and ui and uj are random variables that are related through the copula C[·, ·]
with marginal distributions F iu and F
j
u respectively. Given the assumption that the copula is a Clayton
copula, the equation for Kendall’s tau takes the following form:
(12) τij =
θ
θ + 2
.
Combining equations 11 and 12 gives the next moment condition, which can be expressed as
θ
θ + 2
= 4E
[
C
[
Φ
(
log (biw)− x′iwβ
exp (y′iwσ)
)
,Φ
(
log (bjw)− x′jwβ
exp
(
y′jwσ
) )]]− 1 i 6= j.
The empirical counterpart for the above moment condition is
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.
There is one subtlety in the above equation. The equation for τij (equation 11) is given for copulas with
two random variables, yet many auctions require that I draw bids from copulas with three or more random
variables. In response to this requirement, I first take averages over all combinations of pairs of bids in an
auction and then average over all auctions in order to use all of the information in the sample. In other
words, I find the average Kendall’s tau for each possible pair of bids in each auction and I use that average
when computing the empirical moment condition.
I derive the final set of moment conditions from the moments of the entry distribution. Given that
I assume entry follows a binomial distribution, the first, second, third and fourth moments of the entry
distribution given the number of potential entrants and project characteristics are
E [nmw | xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw] = Nmwpmw,
E
[
n2mw | xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw
]
= Nmwpmw (1− pmw) +N2mwp2mw,
E
[
n3mw | xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw
]
= Nmwpmw
(
1− 3pmw + 3Nmwpmw + 2p2mw − 3Nmwp2mw +N2mwp2mw
)
,
and
E
[
n4mw | xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw
]
= Nmwpmw
(
1− 7pmw + 7Nmwpmw + 12p2mw − 18Nnwp2mw + 6N2mwp2mw
− 6p3mw + 11Nmwp3mw − 6N2mwp3mw +N3mwp3mw
)
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respectively. Taking unconditional expectations over the number of potential entrants and the project
characteristics yields the moment conditions described in section VI.(ii).. These moment conditions are
E [nmw] =
∫
Nmwp (xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw) dF (xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw) ,
E
[
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]
=
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2
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2
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The corresponding empirical moments are then given by
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,
and
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w=1
[
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Appendix E. Project and Subproject Examples
[Place Table VI approximately here]
[Place Figure 9 approximately here]
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Table I: Summary Statistics for New Mexico Highway Construction Projects
Federal-Aid Projects State Projects All Projects
Number of Contracts 353.00 23.00 376.00
Number of Bidders 1469.00 92.00 1561.00
Number of Planholders 4195.00 261.00 4456.00
Average Bid (in 1000s) 4068.05 5469.58 4156.93
Average Winning Bid (in 1000s) 3522.36 4220.64 3565.07
Average Engineer’s Estimate (in 1000s) 3679.79 4628.75 3737.84
Average Resident Bid (in 1000s) 3735.20 4261.57 3771.63
Std. of Resident Bids (in 1000s) 5328.22 7652.71 5517.79
Average Non-Resident Bid (in 1000s) 4913.45 9956.50 5157.47
Std. of Non-Resident Bids (in 1000s) 6875.47 11542.64 7232.36
Average Resident Planholders 9.50 9.91 9.52
Average Resident Bidders 2.97 3.39 3.00
Average Non-Resident Planholders 2.34 2.22 2.33
Average Non-Resident Bidders 1.17 0.91 1.15
Percent of Resident Winners 76.20 78.26 76.33
Fraction of Projects by Type of Road:
Federal Highway 0.59 0.52 0.59
Other Road 0.41 0.48 0.41
Fraction of Projects by Type of Work:
Road Work 0.61 0.52 0.60
Bridge Work 0.20 0.09 0.19
Other Work 0.20 0.39 0.21
Average Contract Observables:
Length (in miles) 5.02 3.79 4.94
Working Days 123.76 121.87 123.65
Number of Licenses Required 1.50 1.48 1.50
DBE Goal (%) 2.06 0.00 1.93
Number of Subprojects 8.14 7.65 8.11
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Table II: Estimated Parameters for the Log-Bid Distribution
Coefficient Standard Error
Constant 0.814 0.115
Resident -0.015 0.011
New Mexico Project -0.140 0.066
Resident x NM Project 0.065 0.072
log(Engineer’s Estimate) 0.921 0.014
log(Length+1) (in miles) 0.035 0.013
log(Working Days) 0.045 0.021
Resident Planholders 0.009 0.005
Non-Resident Planholders 0.002 0.007
Bridge Work -0.003 0.038
Road Work -0.004 0.037
Number of Licenses Required 0.021 0.017
Federal Highway -0.001 0.018
Urban -0.042 0.017
DBE Goal(%) -0.010 0.004
log(Subprojects) 0.069 0.022
Resident Bidders -0.010 0.007
Non-Resident Bidders -0.014 0.011
Standard Deviation Parameters
Constant 0.849 0.066
Resident -0.222 0.146
log(Engineer’s Estimate) -0.166 0.021
Affiliation Parameter
Theta 0.893 0.047
Note : Standard deviation of the bid distribution is estimated as
σ = exp(b0 + b1resident+ b2engineer), where resident is an
indicator for being a resident bidder and engineer is the log of
the enginner’s estimate.
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Table III: Estimated Parameters for the Log-Entry Cost Distribution
Coefficient Standard Error
Constant 0.188 0.096
log(Engineer’s Estimate) 0.746 0.103
Resident 0.289 0.079
Standard Deviation Parameters
Constant -0.365 0.177
Resident 0.173 0.272
Note : Standard deviation of the entry distribution is estimated as
α = exp(b0 + b1resident), where resident is an indicator for being
a resident bidder.
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Table IV: Model Fit
Bidding Only Bidding and Entry
Actual Predicted Std. Error Predicted Std.Error
Federal-Aid Projects (n = 343)
Avg. Bid (1000s) 3836.02 3792.13 (2.28) 3913.93 (7.95)
Avg. Res. Bid (1000s) 3532.29 3496.36 (1.98) 3742.31 (8.93)
Avg. Non-Res. Bid (1000s) 4614.37 4550.08 (4.22) 4381.68 (15.02)
Avg. Winning Bid (1000s) 3366.02 3312.47 (1.94) 3304.12 (2.22)
Perc. Res. Win 76.38 71.27 (0.13) 70.91 (0.15)
Avg. Res. Entrants 2.92 3.04 (0.00)
Avg. Non-Res. Entrants 1.14 1.11 (0.00)
State Projects (n = 22)
Avg. Bid (1000s) 5467.59 5233.78 (13.28) 5511.42 (42.96)
Avg. Res. Bid (1000s) 4201.37 4127.60 (9.8) 4066.95 (49.02)
Avg. Non-Res. Bid (1000s) 10215.90 9381.93 (33.67) 9500.33 (96.23)
Avg. Winning Bid (1000s) 4195.74 4083.62 (10.94) 4091.45 (15.54)
Perc. Res. Win 81.82 78.24 (0.46) 71.14 (0.54)
Avg. Res. Entrants 3.41 2.95 (0.02)
Avg. Non-Res. Entrants 0.91 1.06 (0.01)
Note: This table compares the actual outcomes from New Mexico’s state and federal auctions
used in estimation to the outcomes predicted by the model. Standard errors calculated from 250
bootstrap samples are reported in parentheses.
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Table V: Counterfactual Preference Simulations
Discount (%)
0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
Winning Bid ($1000s)
Affiliation 4190.42 4158.29 4173.09 4217.40 4276.32
Independence 4075.97 4030.02 4039.39 4045.17 4075.60
Difference (%) 2.81 3.18 3.31 4.26 4.92
Efficiency Loss (Actual, $1000)
Affiliation 8.57 13.55 16.67 17.73 12.09
Independence 0.07 0.75 3.48 7.01 10.61
Difference 8.50 12.80 13.19 10.72 1.48
% Inefficient (Actual)
Affiliation 7.89 9.81 11.11 9.88 5.20
Independence 0.50 2.10 4.60 5.99 6.94
Difference 7.39 7.71 6.51 3.89 -1.75
Efficiency Loss (Potential, $1000)
Affiliation 566.15 561.61 552.91 487.91 405.96
Independence 847.93 853.93 841.15 778.09 742.88
Difference -281.78 -292.33 -288.24 -290.18 -336.91
% Inefficient (Potential)
Affiliation 74.81 78.58 79.45 80.54 80.40
Independence 78.59 79.76 79.72 78.94 79.08
Difference -3.78 -1.18 -0.27 1.60 1.32
Note: Average auction outcomes under affiliation and independence for 10,000 simulated
preference auctions. Efficiency is calculated for the actual number of bidders and all potential
entrants.
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Table VI: New Mexico Highway Construction Project Types
Project Type Federal Projects State Projects All Projects
Bridge Rehabilitation 43 2 45
Bridge Replacement 26 0 26
Drainage Improvements 4 0 4
Erosion Control Measures 2 0 2
Fencing 0 2 2
Intelligent Transportation System 1 0 1
Landscaping 1 0 1
Lighting 5 0 5
Miscellaneous 4 2 6
Parking Lot 0 1 1
Pedestrian Trail Rehabilitation 1 0 1
Permanent Signing 3 0 3
Ramp Reconstruction 2 0 2
Ramp Rehabilitation 1 0 1
Rest Area 0 1 1
Roadway New Construction 13 2 15
Roadway Reconstruction 64 3 67
Roadway Rehabilitation 138 6 144
Safety 27 3 30
Signalization 9 0 9
Stockpiling 6 1 7
Structures 2 0 2
Wetland Mitigation 1 0 1
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Figure 2: Bid Functions with Equal Strength Bidders (nR = 3, nNR = 1)
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Figure 3: Bid Functions with a Weak and Strong Group of Bidders (nR = 3, nNR = 1)
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Figure 4: Bid Functions with a High and Low Variance Group of Bidders (nR = 3, nNR = 1)
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Figure 6: Bid Functions under Fixed Participation (nR = 3, nNR = 1)
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Figure 7: Average Winning Bid, Proportion of Resident Winners, and Entry under Alternative Discount
Rates
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Figure 8: Errors for Approximated Bid Functions
Note: This figure plots the first-order conditions associated with the bid functions approximated in Figure
6. I evaluate the first-order conditions on a grid of potential bids, with accuracy determined by how close
the first-order conditions are to zero.
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Figure 9: Examples of Projects and Subprojects
Note: This figure has two example project descriptions in the data. The project descriptions include one
state project (left) and one federal-aid project (right). The main project is written in capital letters under
the ‘Construction Consists Of:’ line, and the subprojects are listed afterward.
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